quently called upon to offer opinions identifying an injury's cause based both on a physical examination of a patient and the exclusion of other causes of the patient's condition. When this type of testimony is presented by physicians, it frequently goes by the name of "differential diagnosis," although some courts have more appropriately called it "differential etiology." 5 Justice Cornyn may have believed that the expert's testimony in Robinson must be admissible because it was so similar to the typical testimony of many medical doctors. Such testimony had been employed in tort cases for many years without criticism from courts or commentators. 6 Perhaps, however, Justice Cornyn foresaw the opposite implication: If Dr. Whitcomb's testimony was inadmissible, it might call into question the differential diagnosis testimony of many physicians. Had Judge Cornyn investigated the law review literature more thoroughly, he would have discovered that such questioning had already begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 7 A number of factors seem to have played a role in this change, among them the increasing use of scientific experts in court, the rise of toxic tort actions, and renewed interest in the criteria used to judge the admissibility of expert testimony. As the 1990s progressed, courts were presented with more admissibility challenges to differential diagnosis testimony. There is now a considerable body of case law on point. 8 Most would agree that the result of these challenges is a body of evidence law that creates more barriers to the admissibility of this evidence. 9 However, 5 . In medical dictionaries, differential diagnosis is defined as "diagnosis based on comparison of symptoms of two or more similar diseases to determine which the patient is suffering from." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 404 (14th ed. 1981). However, in legal usage, the term is not restricted to the process of distinguishing among diseases. Rather, the term also is used to describe the process of differentiating among the possible causes of the plaintiff's ailment. It is with respect to this latter, perhaps incorrect, usage that differential diagnosis has become controversial in legal settings. Differential diagnosis is defined as "a process whereby medical doctors experienced in diagnostic techniques provide testimony countering other possible causes . . . of the injuries at issue." See Cavallo v. Star Enterprise, 892 F. Supp. 756, 771 n.31 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996). Some courts do recognize that the legal usage is contrary to the medical usage and employ the more appropriate term "differential etiology" (the study of the causes of disease LITIG. 193 there is no complete consensus on the requirements for admitting such testimony. On the contrary, the case law is unsettled in some regards. 10 This lack of agreement is not surprising, because differential diagnosis testimony attempts to address some very difficult causal questions, especially when offered in toxic tort cases.
In this article, we use the differential diagnosis opinions to explore a pair of interrelationships. First, we are interested in the relationship between admissibility and causation. In this regard, it is important to understand that in many toxic tort cases the center of gravity on causal questions has shifted to an earlier point in the trial. No longer solely a question for the jury, causation is resolved in an in limine hearing before a jury is even empaneled. 11 The central point is that adjective law 12 and substantive law do not exist in isolation from each other. Our goal is to shed light on how admissibility decisions shape causal questions and, in turn, how causal principles affect admissibility decisions regarding differential diagnosis. Second, we are interested in the relationship between law and science. Specifically, we argue that the Daubert decision has caused courts to be more "scientific" in assessing the admissibility of such testimony. In Part II, we present the basic causal framework employed by most courts in toxic tort cases. Part III sketches out the admissibility rules developed in Daubert and its progeny. Part IV examines the differential diagnosis opinions in the context of both the causation analysis of Part II and the admissibility rules presented in Part III. Part V attempts to explain differences in the opinions based on causal and non-causal factors. It argues that a key to understanding the developing case law in this area is to appreciate the degree to which courts have adopted the interpretive conventions of science in assessing admissibility.
As we shall see, while some cases simply seem to be wrongly decided, many cases could go either way. These cases offer us an opportunity to examine present judicial views as to how tight a causal chain plaintiffs must present to state a prima facie case in this evolving area of law. The final part offers a few thoughts on the proper balance between causal clarity and the role of the jury in tort cases. 10. See infra Part IV for a discussion of areas of agreement and disagreement. 11. One of the unanticipated beneficial consequences of a renewed judicial interest in admissibility is that it has generated a large number of cases addressing complex causal questions. Prior to the rise of this body of law, causal questions were addressed much less frequently. Close questions were simply left to the jury and whatever verdict came out of this black box was rarely overturned on causal grounds.
12. Adjective law is defined as the body of rules governing procedure and practice. As opposed to that body of law which the courts are established to administer (called "substantive law"), it means the rules according to which the substantive law is administered, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 42 (7th ed. 1999).
II CAUSAL ISSUES IN TOXIC TORT CASES
Cause-in-fact in toxic tort cases is usually thought of as two separate issues: general causation and specific causation. 13 General causation asks whether exposure to a substance causes harm to anyone. Specific causation asks whether exposure to a substance caused a particular plaintiff's injury. Under traditional tort theory, a successful plaintiff must prevail by a preponderance of the evidence on both issues.
14 The plaintiff must not only show that, more likely than not, the substance causes the injury in question, but also that, more likely than not, the plaintiff's specific injury was caused by the substance.
15
It would be a mistake to argue that the causal issues in toxic tort cases are fundamentally different from those presented in other tort cases. However, toxic tort cases do differ in degree in several significant ways. 16 First, often there is causal ambiguity. The level of exposure to a substance or a drug-the dose rate-is often uncertain. Evidence of a relationship between the substance and the injury is often uncertain. 17 The timing between exposure and disease may be suspect. 18 These difficulties may create both admissibility and sufficiency questions. Second, there is a fundamental problem of multiple causation. Asbestos, the subject of the first great toxic tort case, 19 is atypical because it causes "signature" diseases. Asbestosis and mesothelioma are diseases so strongly related to asbestos exposure that there is little doubt that a person with these illnesses who has been exposed to asbestos contracted them because of the exposure.
20
Other substances, however, do not cause unique injuries, and substances that do cause signature diseases may also cause others. 21 If, for example, an individual is exposed to asbestos and develops lung cancer, one cannot be certain that the exposure caused the disease. It could be caused by something else, such as ciga-13. Arguably, these are separate issues in all tort cases. However, the general causation issue is often obvious. That cars striking trees at 60 mph might cause injury to occupants is not a point requiring expert testimony. See Note, Navigating Uncertainty: Gatekeeping in the Absence of Hard Science, supra note 9, at 1473.
14. rette smoking. 22 Third, and related to the problem of multiple causation, there is often limited evidence of specific causation, that is, evidence that the substance caused the injury to this particular plaintiff. 23 Plaintiffs may find it difficult to prove that a particular injury was the result of the defendant's substance or another cause.
Courts have provided some solutions to these causal difficulties. The most noteworthy is the use of general causation evidence, such as epidemiological studies, to prove or disprove specific causation. 24 However, this solution is viable only where there is good evidence on general causation. 25 Courts have been less willing to entertain alternatives permitting proportionate recoveries based on the probability that a specific injury was caused by a given exposure, or collectivized, risk-based claims in mass exposure cases.
26
All of these proposed solutions tacitly recognize the difficulty of proving specific causation, and some explicitly attempt to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proof on this element. Because courts have generally refused to relieve the plaintiff from proving specific causation, differential diagnosis evidence is often a crucial component of the plaintiff's case. 27 Without some evidence that the substance in 23. In a few areas there is a fourth difficulty, an indeterminate defendant. The most well-known situation of this kind is the DES litigation, but the problem has arisen in asbestos and lead paint exposure cases as well. In the DES context, many courts have provided a special remedy to plaintiffs facing this problem, the most well-known being market-share liability. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980 LITIGATION (1996) . The courts have also been willing to ease the plaintiff's burden by applying a substantial factor rather than a but-for test in these cases. The use of a substantial factor test has often been implicit. Few if any defendants have successfully advanced the argument that the plaintiff has failed to show but for causation. It is interesting that this fundamental issue has received relatively little attention in the present context. In this brief article, we set aside any further discussion of but for versus substantial factor causal analysis.
26 Cir. 1985) . In a case involving expert testimony on eyewitness identification, Judge Becker said that, to be admitted, the evidence must survive the trial court's preliminary inquiry. See id. at 1226. In an in limine proceeding, the judge should balance the reliability of the scientific principles the expert employed against the likelihood that the evidence may overwhelm or mislead the jury. In addition, the trial court should examine the "fit" between the proffered scientific testimony and the contested issues in the case. 56 provides an instructive example. In Moore, the plaintiff became ill after he was forced to clean up a spill of solvents inside the back of a truck. 57 The trial judge excluded the causation testimony of one of his experts, a specialist in pulmonary, environmental, and internal medicine, which stated that one hour of exposure caused the plaintiff to contract reactive airways dysfunction syndrome.
58
The plaintiff appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling that the exclusion was in error. 59 It held that, while the Daubert Courts may also find a lack of fit when the studies presented by the expert simply fail to support the expert's position. Using the "fit" requirement in this way causes courts to move closer to excluding an expert's testimony because of the expert's conclusion. This is something the Supreme Court in Daubert specifically cautioned against when it said that the focus of the 702 validity inquiry "must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
Most appellate courts downplayed the Supreme Court's methodology-conclusion distinction. For example, in an important Paoli opinion following Daubert, Judge Becker himself said "we think that [the distinction between principles and methods versus conclusions] has only limited practical import. . . . [A] challenge to 'fit' is very close to a challenge to the expert's ultimate conclusion about the particular case, and yet it is part of the judge's admissibility calculus under Daubert." In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 746.
In 59. The appeal followed a trial on the merits. See id. at 679. The case went to trial because the trial court did allow the plaintiff's treating physician to testify on causation. This was a strange pair of rulings because, as the appellate court notes, most of the testimony of the treating physician was based on the tests and assessment of the excluded witness. See Moore, 151 F.3d at 269, 288 n.6. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed, and the Fifth Circuit panel reversed and re-standard applied to all expert evidence, the Daubert factors are "hard" science methods or techniques that should apply only to experts who profess to base their testimony on "hard" science knowledge.
60
These criteria should not be used to judge the admissibility of a clinical physician's expert testimony. 61 Rather, such testimony should be judged by the principles and methodology of the field of clinical medicine. 62 After an en banc review, the circuit reversed and reinstated the judgement for the defendant. 63 The en banc opinion turned primarily on a "fit" analysis. However, it also supported the use of Daubert factors when assessing the admissibility of clinical medical testimony. 64 The proper role of the Daubert factors has arisen in other areas where the expert's testimony rested on professional "experience." For example, the issue presented itself with respect to forensic testimony in the criminal context 65 and products liability design defect testimony.
66
The Supreme Court finally inter- [T]he nonexclusive list of factors relevant under Daubert to assessing scientific methodologytesting, peer review, and "general acceptance"-are also relevant to assessing other types of expert evidence. Whether the expert would opine on economic valuation, advertising psychology, or engineering, application of the Daubert factors is germane to evaluating whether the expert is a hired gun or a person whose opinion in the courtroom will withstand the same scrutiny that it would among his professional peers. . . . Further, it seems exactly backwards that experts who purport to rely on general engineering principles and practical experience vened in this debate in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.
67
In July 1993, eight members of the Carmichael family were involved in a serious automobile accident when the right rear tire of their minivan blew out. 68 After the accident, the plaintiffs' expert examined the tire and concluded that the failure was not the result of any abuse. 69 He therefore concluded that the failure was caused by a defect in either the tire's design or its manufacture. Prior to his testimony, however, the expert became ill and transferred the case to his employee, Dennis Carlson, who reviewed the file and confirmed the initial conclusion.
70
Carlson did not personally examine the tire before rendering his opinion; he first inspected the tire approximately one hour before his deposition. 71 The defendant moved to exclude Carlson's testimony for failing to satisfy Daubert. 72 The trial judge agreed, finding that "none of the four admissibility criteria outlined by the Daubert court are satisfied in this case."
73 Because the expert testimony was the plaintiffs' only evidence of defect, the district judge then granted the defendant summary judgment.
74
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court should not have applied Daubert's reliability framework because Carlson was not a "scientific" expert.
75
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit undertook a de novo review of the trial court's decision to apply Daubert.
76
The court concluded that Daubert applies only to scientific testimony, that Carlson's testimony was non-scientific, and that the district court erred as a matter of law in applying the Daubert criteria. 77 The Eleventh Circuit declared itself prepared to affirm a well-reasoned trial court decision to exclude Carlson's testimony on reliability grounds if, upon remand, the trial court did so without invoking the Daubert criteria. 78 However, in another part of the opinion, the appellate court said that the question in this case is whether Carlson's testimony is based on his application of scientific principles or theories (which we should submit to a Daubert analysis) or on his utilization of personal experience and skill with failed tires (which we would usually expect might escape screening by the district court simply by stating that their conclusions were not reached by any particular method or technique. The moral of this approach would be, the less factual support for an expert's opinion, the better. a district court to allow a jury to evaluate). 79 This sentence suggests that the court believed that a more lenient admissibility standard was appropriate for non-science experts.
The trial court, however, never had a second chance to evaluate the testimony. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the Eleventh Circuit, and held that excluding Carlson's testimony was not an abuse of discretion. 80 As to the role of the Daubert factors, the Court adopted a flexible position:
We also conclude that a trial court may consider one or more of the more specific factors that Daubert mentioned when doing so will help determine that testimony's reliability. But, as the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is "flexible," and Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case. Rather, the law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination. 81 Justice Breyer noted that all four of the Daubert factors do not necessarily apply, even in situations where the reliability of scientific evidence is at issue. 82 A claim may never have been exposed to peer review, because the particular issue may never have interested anyone. 83 It would be a mistake, however, to read Kumho as saying that the trial court simply may ignore the Daubert factors in non-science cases. The Court noted that "a trial court should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony." 84 In a concurring opinion, Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas added that the discretion enjoyed by the trial court does not include the discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function or to perform it inadequately.
85
The justices also said, "[t]hough, as the Court makes clear today, the Daubert factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to apply one or another of them may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion." 86 In effect, a trial court that fails to justify its decision not to use Daubert factors risks reversal. 87 The Kumho opinion included a detailed analysis of the excluded expert testimony. 88 Much of this testimony was the engineering equivalent of a differen- tial diagnosis. As the Court noted, the issue was not whether it is ever possible for a tire expert to use visual and tactile inspection methods to determine whether a tire is defective, but rather, the specific causation question of whether this tire was defective and whether Carlson's methods were reliable with respect to the Carmichaels' tire.
89
Carlson's theory was that, if the vehicle had been overloaded or the tire under-inflated, it would have led to a phenomenon called "overdeflection." 90 Overdeflection can cause the tire to overheat, which in turn can undo the bond that holds the tire tread to the carcass. 91 Carlson described four indicia of overdeflection and explained that a tire exhibiting two of the four indicia had been abused. 92 Though he conceded that the tire did exhibit some of these indicia, he stated that these symptoms were not significant. 93 For example, according to Carlson, one of the symptoms of overdeflection is greater tread wear on the tire's shoulder than along the tire's center. 94 Carlson concluded that there was greater wear on the shoulders of this carcass, but he also concluded that it was not evenly distributed on both shoulders. 95 On this tire, the wear appeared primarily on one shoulder, whereas an overdeflected tire would show equal abnormal wear on both. 96 Therefore, this wear was not evidence of overdeflection. 97 This reasoning process is not unlike a physician's differential diagnosis testimony excluding other possible causes of a patient's illness. Why was this analysis not sufficiently reliable to gain admissibility? Another part of Carlson's testimony provides a partial answer. He was asked how many miles the tire had traveled prior to the accident. 98 According to the Supreme Court, he "could not say whether the tire had traveled more than ten, or twenty, or thirty, or forty, or fifty thousand miles, adding that 6,000 miles was 'about how far' he could 'say with any certainty. ' The [trial] court could reasonably have wondered about the reliability of a method of visual and tactile inspection sufficiently precise to ascertain with some certainty the abuse-related significance of minute shoulder/center relative tread wear differences, but insufficiently precise to tell "with any certainty" from the tread wear whether a tire had traveled less than 10,000 or more than 50,000 miles. And these concerns might have been augmented by Carlson's repeated reliance on the "subjective[ness]" of his mode of analysis in response to questions seeking specific information regarding how he could differentiate between a tire that actually had been overdeflected and a tire that merely looked as though it had been.
100
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically tie its analysis to the Daubert factors, the reference to subjectivity suggests that it was questioning the falsifiability and perhaps the error rate of Carlson's theory. The Court noted that Carlson's overdeflection test-that a tire has not been abused unless it exhibits two of his four overdeflection indicia-is generally not accepted.
101
According to the Court, the purpose of the relevancy and reliability requirements under Daubert is "to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."
102
In the eyes of the court, Carlson's testimony did not meet this standard.
103
If Kumho removed any uncertainty about whether the Daubert factors might apply to differential diagnosis testimony, it settled little else. The Kumho opinion itself is unclear on several points. 104 Because both the decision to admit expert testimony and the criteria used to make an admissibility decision are to be judged by an abuse of discretion standard on appeal, it is possible we will witness conflicting trial court admissibility decisions on similar facts.
105
This is all the more likely because, as discussed in the next section, the circuits have taken varying positions about the admissibility requirements for clinical medical testimony on causation. In the next section, we review the criteria used by the courts in making their judgments. 
IV THE DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS ADMISSIBILITY OPINIONS
We should begin by noting that there is much common ground with respect to the admissibility of differential diagnosis testimony. Courts generally agree that, at least in toxic tort cases, whenever there are competing causes for the plaintiff's injury, an expert must attempt a differential diagnosis before his testimony will be admitted. For example, in O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 106 the court excluded expert testimony of a physician who claimed he could determine that the plaintiff's posterior subcapsular cataract was only caused by radiation by looking at it. Moreover, no opinion we know of has concluded that differential etiology, when properly performed, is inadmissible. 107 Here it is useful to follow Professor Paul C. Gianelli and divide the question of scientific validity into several categories: "(1) the validity of the underlying principle, (2) the validity of the technique applying the principle, and (3) the proper application of the technique on a particular occasion."
108 This formulation is repeated by Judge Becker in United States v. Downing.
109
Courts accept the general validity of the technique of differential diagnosis.
It is not sufficient, however, for an expert simply to state that she has performed a differential diagnosis. Much as the Supreme Court did in Kumho, courts that refuse to admit a differential diagnosis frequently cite the quality of the expert analysis-the application of the technique in the case at hand-as the reason for exclusion. Several pre-Daubert opinions adopted this position. In the Agent Orange litigation, Judge Jack Weinstein excluded the testimony of a physician who determined the cause of the plaintiffs' injuries on the basis of the plaintiffs' signed statements that they had been exposed to Agent Orange and had the listed symptoms. 110 Similarly, in Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 111 the court excluded a physician's testimony that the defendant had caused plaintiff's illness, because the doctor had relied on a medical history that omitted important information. 112 The Viterbo court concluded:
We do not hold, of course, that admissibility of an expert opinion depends upon the expert disproving or discrediting every possible cause other than the one espoused by him. and (2) whether temporal order alone-that the cause preceded the effect-is sufficient to support the causal attribution.
A. Ruling in Before Ruling Out
In Cavallo v. Star Enterprise, the trial judge made the following comment:
The process of differential diagnosis is undoubtedly important to the question of "specific causation." If other possible causes of an injury cannot be ruled out, or at least the probability of their contribution to causation minimized, then the "more likely than not" threshold for proving causation may not be met. But, it is also important to recognize that a fundamental assumption underlying this method is that the final, suspected "cause" remaining after this process of elimination must actually be capable of causing the injury. That is, the expert must "rule in" the suspected cause as well as "rule out" other possible causes. And, of course, expert opinion on this issue of "general causation" must be derived from a scientifically valid methodology.
122
The "rule in before ruling out" position of Cavallo presumes that, at least in toxic tort cases, a differential diagnosis, no matter how well done, can rarely prove general causation by itself. The Cavallo position has been repeated in numerous cases. 
124
The court there held that "testimony on specific causation had legitimacy only as follow-up to admissible evidence that the drug in question could in general cause birth defects. That first step, establishing a link between Bendectin and human birth defects (general causation), is missing here." 125 The "rule in" requirement sometimes is presented as a question of dosage. Assuming that some dose of the substance at issue might cause harm, the question becomes: Does the expert have adequate grounds for asserting that the dosage to which the plaintiff was exposed could cause anyone harm? The recent case of Mancuso v. Consolidated Edison explained that [a] fundamental tenet of toxicology is that the "dose makes the poison" and that all chemical agents, including water, are harmful if consumed in large quantities, while even the most toxic substances are harmless in minute quantities . . . . Therefore, in determining whether plaintiffs' exposure to PCBs could have caused any illnesses that they have, it is necessary to establish the dose/response relationship between PCBs and those particular illnesses. 133 The Mancuso court rejected the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert who was prepared to testify that exposure to PCB caused a variety of injuries. 134 The court concluded that the plaintiff's expert "totally ignored the methodology prescribed by both the World Health Organization (WHO) and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) for determining whether a person has been adversely affected by a toxin." 135 As the court noted later in the opinion, there is a three step procedure to the methodology:
First, the level of exposure of plaintiff to the toxin in question must be determined; second, from a review of the scientific literature, it must be established that the toxin is capable of producing plaintiff's illness-called "general causation"-and the dose/response relationship between the toxin and the illness-that is, the level of exposure which will produce such an illness-must be ascertained; and third, "specific causation" must be established by demonstrating the probability that the toxin caused
The process of differential diagnosis is undoubtedly important to the question of "specific causation." If other possible causes of an injury cannot be ruled out, or at least the probability of their contribution to causation minimized, then the "more likely than not" threshold for proving causation may not be met. But, it is also important to recognize that a fundamental assumption underlying this method is that the final, suspected "cause" remaining after this process of elimination must actually be capable of causing the injury. That is, the expert must "rule in" the suspected cause as well as "rule out" other possible causes. And, of course, expert opinion on this issue of "general causation" must be derived from a scientifically valid methodology. Contrary to these holdings, several courts appear either to reject the requirement that one must first rule in before ruling out or to reject the requirement that plaintiff's experts cite clear evidence that the substance in question can cause injuries at the dose levels experienced by the plaintiff. For example, in a case decided not long after Daubert, physicians were permitted to testify that Hot Stuff "anabolic activator" caused diverticulosis and diverticulitis, based primarily on differential diagnosis, despite the fact that "there is no peer reviewed documentation that any of the ingredients in Hot Stuff, individually or in combination, causes diverticulosis, diverticulitis or diverticulum perforation."
138 If other evidence proving general causation is a prerequisite for differential diagnosis testimony, the appellate court in Kannankeril v. Terminix International, Inc. erred when it reversed a district court decision to exclude the testimony of the plaintiff's only expert and enter a summary judgment for the defendant.
139
The plaintiff's expert concluded that her injuries were caused by Dursban, even though the evidence on dosage was quite limited. 140 In addition, the expert performed no clinical tests to support his causal opinion, and the only blood test conducted on the plaintiff was negative for Dursban. 141 In Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi, the plaintiff's expert testified that his exposure to airborne talc in the workplace caused the aggravation of his pre-existing sinus condition. 142 The appellate court affirmed the admission of this testimony by the trial court following a jury verdict for the plaintiff even though the expert "had no scientific literature on which to rely to 'rule in' talc as a possible basis for Westberry's sinus condition." 143 In support of its position, the court noted that the plaintiff himself had testified to very high levels of talc in the workplace, and the Material Safety Data Sheet for talc provided that inhalation in high concentrations irritates mucous membranes. 144 Becker specifically rejected the requirement that plaintiff's expert always cite published studies on general causation reliably to conclude that a particular object caused a particular illness. 146 In Heller, the court seems to have assumed there was no research on the general causation question.
B. Temporal Order
The question of general causation aside, there remains the difficult question of what differential diagnosis evidence the expert must present to make an admissible argument on specific causation. Disagreements on this question are most evident in cases that discuss whether the temporal order of events alonethe injury followed the exposure-is sufficient to rule out other possible causes.
147 Most cases that have discussed the issue have stated that temporal order alone is insufficient to support an expert's opinion that substance X caused injury Y.
148
Statements to this effect may be found in a number of swine flu cases from the early 1980s.
149 Post-Daubert opinions that apply the Daubert factors frequently take the position that determinations of causation based solely 146. See id. at 155. However, the appellate court concluded that exclusion of the expert's testimony was not an abuse of discretion because the evidence did not support the doctor's reliance on the temporal relationship between the onset of the plaintiff's illness and the carpet installation nor his estimate of the levels of volatile organic compounds emitted by the carpet. See id. at 164.
147. Temporal order is one consideration in determining whether a relationship is causal. Researchers have developed a number of criteria that may be used in making this assessment. One of the best known is a set of criteria originally developed by Sir Austin Bradford Hill:
(1) Is the temporal relationship correct? Does the "effect" follow the "cause"? (2) Is there evidence from true experiments in humans? (3) Is the association a strong one? (4) Is the association consistent from study to study? (5) Is there a dose-response gradient? (6) Is the association specific? (7) Does the association make biological sense? The close temporal relation between the vaccination and onset of neurologic symptoms convinces us that the vaccine was in fact the proximate cause of those symptoms. The thirty-day interval between plaintiff's vaccination and the onset of her symptoms falls well within the ten week period in which the government concedes the vaccine may cause Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS). See also Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that exclusion of the expert's testimony was not an abuse of discretion because the evidence did not support the doctor's reliance on a temporal relationship between the onset of the plaintiff's illness and the carpet installation nor his estimate of the levels of volatile organic compounds emitted by the carpet). on temporal order should be excluded for lack of reliability.
150
The following passage is typical of the reason given for exclusion: Dr . Winters (and Dr. Shalat) propound the argument that because [acute lymphocytic leukemia ("ALL")] is extremely rare in adult males, and because Gary Whiting was exposed to radiation before he contracted ALL, his ALL must have been caused by radiation exposure. This is a classic illustration of the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc. It ignores the fact that ALL can occur (and most often does) in adult males who have no history of occupational exposure to radiation, as well as the fact that adult males who are exposed to radiation at levels similar to Gary Whiting's have no higher incidence of ALL than do unexposed adult males. [T]he witness admits that if the Plaintiff did not have breast implants but had the exact same symptoms and blood chemistry, then his diagnosis would have been non-implant-caused Sjogren's Syndrome. Essentially, this is a bit like saying that if a person has a scratchy throat, runny nose, and a nasty cough, that person has a cold; if, on the other-hand, that person has a scratchy throat, runny nose, nasty cough, and wears a watch, they have a watch-induced cold. [A]t bottom, [the expert's] opinion is founded primarily on the temporal connection between the spill and the development of Ms. Cavallo's symptoms, as well as on his subjective, unverified, belief that AvJet can cause the types of injuries from which Ms. Cavallo suffers. This is not the method of science.
As is the case with ruling in before ruling out, however, a number of courts have permitted experts to testify as to specific causation based on little more than temporal order. Not surprisingly, perhaps, many of these cases are the same ones adopting the minority position on ruling in before ruling out. For example, in Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 152 in addition to objecting that the expert failed to rule in talc before ruling out other causes, the defendant also objected that the expert's causal analysis rested almost entirely on the temporal order of events. The court replied that "depending on the circumstances, a temporal relationship between exposure to a substance and the onset of a disease or a worsening of symptoms can provide compelling evidence of causation." 153 The court found the temporal evidence here compelling partly because the plaintiff's sinus condition improved when he stayed home from work. In this case, homeowners sued a pest exterminator for a wideranging set of cognitive impairment injuries to Dr. Mary Kannankeril from application of the pesticide Dursban at their residence. 156 Dr. Kannankeril's symptoms began approximately one year after the beginning of the Terminix service. After an application that produced objectionable odors, the defendant sent a company to clean the residence. Nine months later, the plaintiffs asked the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection to test their home. 157 An analysis of air samples taken at that time failed to find detectable levels of pesticides.
158 Apparently, Dr. Kannankeril's symptoms did not abate after the pesticide applications ceased.
159
The plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Benjamin Gerson, testified that "[t]he temporal relationship and the nature of her complaints lead me to conclude that with reasonable medical certainty, the cause of Dr. Kannankeril's Central Nervous System manifestations of toxicity is exposure to Dursban in [sic] 1989 to 1990." 160 The trial judge had excluded this expert's testimony and granted summary judgment for the defendant. 161 The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. 162 Dr. Gerson did not rule out other possible causes of the plaintiff's illness, but the court noted that the defendant had not pointed to any other plausible cause. Although the court noted that the defendant is not obligated to offer alternative theories of causation, its failure to do so seemingly relieved the expert from offering his own. 163 Temporal order seems to have been the primary basis of the expert's opinion.
In Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc., refinery workers brought an action against the defendants for health problems caused by exposure to excessive amounts of benzene.
164 There appeared to be little doubt that exposure to benzene at levels present in the plant could cause injuries similar to those suffered by the plaintiffs. 165 In addition to this general causation evidence, the plaintiffs' expert pointed to the strong temporal connection between the workers' exposure to benzene and the onset of their symptoms. 166 However, he did not undertake a differential diagnosis. 167 For this reason, the trial judge refused to admit his testimony. 168 The Fifth Circuit reversed on this point. 169 On the question of specific causation the court said that Dr . Stevens pointed to the strong temporal connection between the refinery workers' exposure to benzene and the onset of their symptoms. The refinery workers developed their symptoms contemporaneously with the first attempts to process HAD, and their symptoms subsided within two weeks after they left the refinery. A temporal connection standing alone is entitled to little weight in determining causation. However, a temporal connection is entitled to greater weight when there is an established scientific connection between exposure and illness or other circumstantial evidence supporting the causal link. In the present case, both scientific literature and strong circumstantial evidence support the causal connection. 170 Recently, in Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson & Co., the Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court judge's exclusion of the plaintiff's experts who were prepared to testify that the plaintiff's fall at a construction site caused his chronic pain syndrome ("CPS"). 171 The trial judge had refused to admit the testimony because he concluded that the experts had no scientific basis for their testimony. Each physician had relied on the plaintiff's statements about his past medical history as the basis for the diagnosis that the fall caused his CPS. 172 Dr. Richardson, one of the experts, said that, based on Mr. Cooper's statement that he had been without pain before the fall, the pain was caused by the fall. 173 He also explained that the cause of Mr. Cooper's trauma was irrelevant to him in prescribing a course of treatment and that, therefore, he did not inquire further as to the cause of Mr. Cooper's CPS. 174 On cross examination, the defendant elicited testimony that Dr. Richardson had really not investigated into the cause of the plaintiff's pain. 175 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant's argument, that the expert's post hoc ergo propter hoc determination of causation was not an acceptable methodology in cases where the mechanism of injury is not understood, went to the weight of the medical testimony, not its admissibility.
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V UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES How might we understand this set of admissibility opinions? In this final section, we note three factors that seem to affect the outcome in these cases: the commitment to jury decisionmaking, the quality of the available causal information, and the type of reasoning employed by the expert.
A. Commitment to Jury Decisionmaking
The different results in these cases are partly attributable to a non-causal consideration: a commitment to jury decisionmaking. In the face of increasing trial complexity and the growth of scientific testimony, many courts have been more willing to take steps that erode traditional adversary processes and adopt a more inquisitorial style of adjudication.
177 With respect to the admissibility of expert testimony, this has meant that judges have been more willing to limit party control of the evidence that reaches the jury.
processes than other circuits, notably the Fifth. This non-causal consideration undoubtedly plays some role in explaining the differences we observe regarding differential diagnosis admissibility decisions.
B. Quality of the Available Causal Information
Some of the differences in the admissibility opinions may be understood as a function of the underlying quality of the available causal information. The opinions that require the expert to "rule in before ruling out" are, in our view, correct. However, some of the courts that appear to have retreated from this requirement have addressed fact patterns where there was some evidence of general causation. This is most clear in cases like Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, where the issue was one of dosage as much as whether even very heavy concentrations of talc could cause injury.
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Other cases appear to relax the plaintiff's burden on this issue when the court believes that there is little or no information on whether a substance causes injury. The temporal relationship will often be (only) one factor, and how much weight it provides for the overall determination of whether an expert has "good grounds" for his or her conclusion will differ depending on the strength of that relationship. For example, if there was a minor oil spill on the Hudson River on the same day that Heller began experiencing her symptoms in West Chester, Pennsylvania, and she recovered around the time the oil was cleaned up, a proper differential diagnosis and temporal analysis by a well-qualified physician such as Dr. Papano could not possibly lead to the conclusion that the oil spill caused Heller's illness. Conversely, "if a person were doused with chemical X and immediately thereafter developed symptom Y, the need for published literature showing a correlation between the two may be lessened." The present case falls between these two hypotheticals. In this middle area, we do not believe that Daubert and Paoli require a physician to rely on definitive published studies before concluding that exposure to a particular object or chemical was the most likely cause of a plaintiff's illness. Id. at 154 (citations omitted).
Unfortunately, Judge Becker leaves us with the suggestion that what distinguishes these two cases is the strength of the temporal order. This alone, however, cannot be the determining factor. The temporal relationship between exposure and illness might be identical in the two hypotheticals, but we presume Judge Becker would exclude the testimony in the Hudson River spill case. What is missing in both cases is a lack of proof of general causation. If Judge Becker were to be told that the chemical X with which the plaintiff was doused in the second situation was an incredibly weak solution, presumably temporal order alone would not suffice.
182. the correct dosage of the medication for another two months, when she was advised to cease due to adverse symptoms. 185 Because of the rareness of primary pulmonary hypertension and the lack of any formal research on the effects of Danocrine at the higher dosage, the experts could not point to specific research supporting their differential diagnosis that the drug caused the decedent's illness. 186 They could, however, point to studies identifying other agents, such as birth control pills, some appetite suppressants, and chemotherapy drugs, that cause this illness. 187 Affirming the trial court's decision to admit the testimony, Judge Calabresi noted that the experts were able to provide a biologically plausible reason why the drug could cause this effect.
188
In many situations it would be an insurmountable burden for the plaintiff to present substantial epidemiological or animal study data indicating adverse health effects from a given dose of a substance. In both Heller and Zuchowicz, the court implicitly recognized this fact and allowed the plaintiff to proceed with relatively less evidence than would be required if there were a substantial body of research. In this respect, these decisions conform to Gerald Boston's observation that courts have frequently relaxed the plaintiff's obligation to produce hard science on general causation for injuries that may be placed in the "sporadic accident model" of tort law. 189 In these cases, where only a single plaintiff or a few plaintiffs have allegedly suffered an injury due to exposure, a medical doctor will be permitted to render an opinion on general causation with little or no epidemiological evidence and sometimes with very little toxicological evidence.
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Examples of such cases include specific medical treatments, as in Zuchowicz, and nonrecurring occupational diseases that affect a limited number of individuals, as in Heller. 191 However, courts have not been willing to go beyond this and adopt the proposals of some commentators who argue that, in situations of irreducible causal uncertainty, the plaintiff should either be relieved of the burden of persuasion on the causal question or should be permitted some percentage recovery, as long as the plaintiff could establish strong un- hypothesized that the fall at Food Lion caused physical trauma to Black, which caused 'hormonal changes,' which caused Black's fibromyalgia." 205 The case was removed to a federal court and tried before a magistrate who, over defense objections, permitted Dr. Reyna to testify and awarded a judgment to the plaintiff based on the testimony.
206
In reversing the fibromyalgia damages, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the utility of the differential diagnosis process but noted that, under Daubert, Kumho, and Moore, it must be applied fact-specifically in each case. 207 With respect to this fact-specific differential diagnosis, the Fifth Circuit made the following observation: This analysis amounts to saying that because Dr. Reyna thought she had eliminated other possible causes of fibromyalgia, even though she does not know the real "cause," it had to be the fall at Food Lion.
In this case, neither Dr. Reyna nor medical science knows the exact process that results in fibromyalgia or the factors that trigger the process. Absent these critical scientific predicates, for which there is no proof in the record, no scientifically reliable conclusion on causation can be drawn. Dr. Reyna's use of a general methodology cannot vindicate a conclusion for which there is no underlying medical support.
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Although the expert purported to perform most of the steps required of a differential diagnosis, the Fifth Circuit found that her analysis only loosely linked some generalities. 209 Although falls may cause fibromyalgia, it is not clear that they are a typical or frequent cause. 210 This becomes particularly important when, as in this case, one cannot assume that most causes of any given ailment are known. Otherwise, as Susan R. Poulter has noted, 211 the elimination of other risk factors would not significantly increase the likelihood that the exposure was the cause of the plaintiff's injury. 212 In such situations, one cannot make a Sherlock Holmes-like deduction that simply because all other known causes have been eliminated, the only known cause left, no matter how improbable, must be the actual cause. From this perspective, the outcome in Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson & Co. 213 is more difficult to justify. Perhaps it should instead be understood as an opinion reflecting a stronger commitment to jury decisionmaking.
C. Style of Reasoning Adopted by the Expert A court's decision whether or not to admit an expert's testimony may be affected by the style of reasoning employed by the expert. The district court in Sanderson v. International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc., explicitly states a point that is often implicit in other opinions. 214 The plaintiff argued that the Court should adopt a "common-sense," lay interpretation of causation. She contends that because her injuries are of the type caused by defendants' products, she was exposed to same, and there is a temporal connection between such exposures and her experience of symptoms, a jury could find that defendants' products caused her injuries.
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The court rejected this argument. 216 In a case requiring expert testimony on causation, neither the plaintiff nor the plaintiff's experts may rely exclusively on the common-sense causal conclusion that arises from temporal order. 217 Sanderson's expert could not identify anything other than pure temporal coincidence to support his probability estimate, and based it upon what he knows about people with similar health problems, "not necessarily with fragrances but from other chemicals." He also admitted that there are no published statistics that would allow him to calculate or quantify the relative risk of any of the plaintiff's injuries. 218 The court concluded that this was not a "scientific connection" and that the expert's testimony did not meet the Daubert standard. 219 What, from the court's perspective, is wrong with "common sense" in this context? The answer, it seems, is that the approach is not "scientific." In Sanderson, as in other cases discussed above, the court criticized experts for dom havoc. This belief is not supported by the scientific studies he refers to . . . . This is post hoc propter hoc reasoning at its rankest, and is contrary to the "hard look" encouraged and even required by our case law. failing to take a "scientific approach." There is, of course, no bright-line test for distinguishing between scientific and non-scientific opinions. However, dualprocess theory in social psychology offers some insights as to what the courts have in mind. This body of research argues that individuals have two systems for processing information. 220 Experiential processing is more holistic, tends to be outcome-oriented, and tends to represent events as concrete exemplars. 221 Rational processing, on the other hand, is more analytic, relies more on abstract symbols, and is process-oriented. 222 By and large, science is more committed to rational, rather than experiential, processing of information. 223 When courts object that an approach is insufficiently scientific, they often seem to be suggesting that it is insufficiently rational in this sense. Judges find less acceptable those expert judgments relying primarily on the expert's intuition 224 and professional judgment, 225 -judgments that reflect a greater degree of experiential processing. 226 Here we see the impact of Daubert, Kumho, and more than a decade of post-Frye jurisprudence. At bottom, the Daubert revolution is about the relationship between law and science. Frye asked judges to acquiesce in the judgment of the relevant scientific community. It invited judges to accept an expert's judgment as long as it appeared to be within the mainstream of scientific opinion. 227 Daubert, on the other hand, invites the trial court to make an independent inquiry. 228 The judge should determine whether the proffered evidence is reliable by examining the reasoning and methodology underlying the expert's testimony. 229 As Michael J. Saks recently noted, "perhaps the purpose of the rules is simply to hold up a target to the courts; call one the Frye target and the other the Daubert target. The Frye ideal says: Do whatever the experts tell you to do. The Daubert ideal says: Figure out the science yourself." 230 In figuring it out for themselves, judges have moved steadily toward the interpretive prac-tices of science. 231 Those interpretive practices-the generally accepted types of arguments and data interpretation that define the interpretive community of science-typically involve rational processing. 232 In this area at least, the interpretive communities of science and law have tended to converge. 233 By its refusal to distinguish between scientific experts and other experts, Kumho has reinforced this movement in areas such as differential diagnosis.
Zuchowicz v. United States is an example of a case where the style of reasoning in the expert testimony arguably made a difference in an otherwise difficult causal argument. 234 The experts' conclusion was primarily based on tempo-ral order. But their testimony also was fully within the rational processing style. It was analytic, it relied more on abstract symbols, and it was process-oriented. Both the trial court and the Second Circuit found it to be admissible.
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If our argument is correct, then testimony that is both in a rationalprocessing style and is supported by higher quality causal information is more likely to be admitted. One should note, however, that these are not entirely separate criteria. The definition of what constitutes higher-quality causal information is greatly affected by whether the information itself is presented in this style. The very ability to construct a plausible rational processing style argument is in part contingent on the existence of research done and presented in this way. In this sense, style and substance are inevitably intertwined.
VI CONCLUSION
This article has focused on one of the more difficult causal issues in torts today, the proof of specific causation in toxic tort suits. Typically, plaintiffs' experts attempt to prove specific causation through a process that the courts have called differential diagnosis. Given the difficulty of the question, it is not surprising that courts have made inconsistent pronouncements on issues such as ruling-in before ruling-out and the sufficiency of temporal order evidence. What is surprising is the fair degree of consensus that has been achieved on these questions. Moreover, a number of the opinions in the minority on these issues can be reconciled with the majority view based on the strength of the causal information available and the way in which the experts presented the evidence.
We believe that it is fair to say that differential diagnosis testimony generally is looked upon with greater skepticism than was the case prior to the Daubert revolution. Courts are less likely to admit the testimony. In part, this is because in the toxic tort arena plaintiffs are attempting more difficult causal arguments. We believe it is also because courts have become more demanding by requiring better science before admitting testimony. Justice Cornyn was right to be concerned in Robinson. With respect to harm to both the plants in Robinson and the people in the differential diagnosis cases, plaintiffs are held to a more rigorous standard. Dr . Randall Tackett is a tenured, full professor of pharmacology and former department chair from the University of Georgia. He has published widely in the field of the effects of drugs on vascular tissues. Dr. Tackett testified that, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, he believed that the overdose of Danocrine, more likely than not, caused PPH in the plaintiff by producing: 1) a decrease in estrogen; 2) hyperinsulinemia, in which abnormally high levels of insulin circulate in the body; and 3) increases in free testosterone and progesterone. Dr. Tackett testified that these hormonal factors, taken together, likely caused a dysfunction of the endothelium leading to PPH. Dr. Tackett relied on a variety of published and unpublished studies that indicated that these hormones could cause endothelial dysfunction and an imbalance of vasoconstrictor effects. 140 F.3d 381, 385-86 (2d Cir. 1998).
235. See Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 387.
